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I. Overview
The papers in this issue were presented at the third conference
in the series "The Future of the Adversarial System," each of
which was held at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.' The theme in 2011 was a comparison of the application of
European Union criminal justice measures as they apply across
different European criminal procedures, with the American federal
system. The conference was designed to encourage consideration
of, and comparison between, different legal models in which the
rulings and instruments of one overarching court or legislature
must be applied by a myriad of courts subservient to this higher
legal authority. This includes the European Court of Human
f Jacqueline Hodgson teaches at Warwick School of Law. Professor Hodgson holds an
L.L.B. and Ph.D. and has researched and written in the area of United Kingdom, French,
comparative, and European criminal justice. Much of her work draws upon her own
empirical projects funded by the ESRC, Nuffield Foundation,. British Academy,
Leverhume Trust, AHRC, and the Home Office.
I See Conference: The Future of the Adversarial System, THE UNIV. OF N.C. ScH.
OF LAW, http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/conferences/adversary/default.aspx (last visited
Nov. 29, 2011). The series has been a great success, bringing together academics and
practitioners from across Europe and North America to exchange ideas and experiences
and to discuss aspects of domestic, European, comparative, and international criminal
procedure in practical terms. I would like to register my thanks to Mike Corrado for
organizing the conferences and including me from the outset. I have learned a lot and
made many friends in the process. In the Spring of 2009, the first conference focused on
"The Future of the Adversarial System." See 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG., 285-538
(2009). In 2010, we turned our attention to the International Criminal Court. See 36
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG., 255-497 (2010).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Rights (hereinafter "ECtHR"), which is the court that interprets the
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the
"Convention") and whose case law applies not only to the country
before it, but also to all forty-seven members of the Council of
Europe. This also includes the European Union, whose legal
instruments must be translated more directly into the domestic
legislation of the twenty-seven Member States and whose court,
the European Court of Justice, will rule on the interpretation and
implementation of EU law. Finally, this includes the American
federal model, where the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court bind
state courts.
The context of the conference theme2 is the growing field of
the EU criminal justice system in which police and judicial co-
operation measures apply across (the often very different) legal
systems of the twenty-seven Member States. Whilst Member
States have agreed upon investigation, prosecution, and sentencing
measures with relative ease, their adoption of corresponding
safeguards that would apply universally across the European
Union has proven to be more problematic.' Some have objected
that such safeguards are unnecessary because sufficient guarantees
are provided by the Convention, to which all Member States are
signatories.4 Others argue that procedural safeguards cannot be
legislated for in a "one-size-fits-all" model, as the European Union
proposes.' This has led to a clash of legal models and a resistance
to what is seen as the imposition of adversarialism across Europe.
The right to legal assistance during police detention and
interrogation illustrates this conflict most strongly: Is this a
specific adversarial safeguard or a universal guarantee that applies
across all procedural models, complementing rather than
challenging even pre-trial judicial supervision?6 France prefers
the term contradictoire to adversarial. The term contradictoire is
2 See Jacqueline Hodgson, Safeguarding Suspects' Rights in Europe: A
Comparative Perspective, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 4, 611-55 (2011) (serving as the
background paper to the conference and providing a stimulus for discussion).
3 See id; Taru Spronken & Dorris de Vocht, EU Policy to Guarantee Procedural
Rights in Criminal Proceedings: "Step by Step," 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 436
(2011).
4 See Hodgson, supra note 2.
5 See id
6 See id.
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closer to the term "accusatorial," referring to the accused's right to
see and to respond to the evidence against her, rather than
adversarialism, which represents an entire system model, a
methodology from investigation to trial.' Presented in this way,
due process rights are understood in countries such as France as
checks on an existing centralized investigation model rather than
as a shift towards a fundamentally different procedure. However,
this model is becoming less tenable, as the lawyer's role is slowly
advancing into the earliest pre-trial stages and the role of the
supervising prosecutor can be challenged as ineffective' and non-
judicial.'
Why has the European Union considered it necessary to
prescribe procedural safeguards that set out in detail the basic
rights already guaranteed in the Convention? The answer is that,
in practice, the Convention does not provide a consistent level of
safeguards, and enforcement is on a case-by-case basis and is thus
relatively weak.'o This leaves those subject to measures such as
the European Arrest Warrant" with uneven due process
protections. It also undermines mutual trust among Member
States, a key element to effective cooperation. Unlike many other
areas of EU activity, the basis for EU police and judicial
cooperation is not harmonization and imposition of uniform
procedures upon all Member States; the basis is the principle of
mutual recognition, described as the "cornerstone" of such
cooperation. National measures such as a judicial decision within
a member state must be recognized in all other Member States and
have the same or similar effects there, 2 enabling states to work
7 See JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE
ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE 42-43 (2005).
8 See id. at 245-46.
9 See Eur. Consult. Ass., Medvedyev and Others v. France, HUM. RTS. INFO.
BULL., Mar. 2010-July 2010, at 14, 15; Press Release No. 881, Eur. Ct. H.R., Applicant's
Police Custody Did Not Satisfy the Requirements of Article 5 § 3 (Nov. 23, 2010);
Jacqueline S. Hodgson, The French Prosecutor in Question, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1361, 1388 (2010).
10 See Hodgson, supra note 2; Spronken & de Vocht, supra note 3.
11 The European Arrest Warrant enables the rapid extradition of citizens within the
European Union. See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, on the European
Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, 2002 O.J. (L 190)
(1), (5)-(6) [hereinafter European Arrest Warrant].
12 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and European
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together effectively but "with a minimum of procedure and
formality."' 3  Thus, evidence can be exchanged under the
European Evidence Warrant;14 or now the proposed European
Investigation Order," without scrutiny regarding how it was
obtained; sentences are recognized between countries;16  and
citizens are extradited through a judicial procedure that requires no
consideration of the evidence for offenses that may not even be
criminal in the extraditing state." Underpinning this cooperation
is an assumption that all Member States (as signatories to the
Convention) are human-rights compliant. Of course, this is not the
case, and even where they are compliant, broad guarantees, such
as the right to a fair trial under Article Six of the Convention, are
assured in different ways across different procedures. For
example, those rooted in a more inquisitorial tradition will
typically rely more on judicial and prosecutorial supervision than
on a defense input.
This is problematic because, under the mutual recognition
principle, cooperation across jurisdictions does not take into
account these procedural differences and thus risks creating gaps
in due process protections. For example, an English court will
have to determine what weight it will give to a confession
obtained without the presence of a lawyer and not tape recorded
Parliament, Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, at 2, COM
(2000) 495 final (July 26, 2000).
13 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition
in Criminal Matters in the EU, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (2006).
14 See Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA, on the European Evidence
Warrant for the Purpose of Obtaining Objects, Documents, and Data for Use in
Proceedings in Criminal Matters, 2008 O.J. (L 350) 7.
15 See Council of the European Union 10749/2/11 REV 2 of 8 June 2011, art.1,
1-2 (containing the current version of the proposed European Investigation Order); see
also Council of the European Union 9145/10 of 29 April 2010, art. 1, 1-2 (evidencing
the original proposed directive published).
16 See Council Framework Decision 5602/08, on the Application of the Principle of
Mutual Recognition to Judgments in Criminal Matters Imposing Custodial Sentences or
Measures Involving Deprivation of Liberty for the Purpose of Their Enforcement in the
European Union, 5.
17 See European Arrest Warrant, supra note 11, at art. 4, 1. In thirty-two broad
offence categories, including terrorism, fraud, drugs trafficking, and murder, the dual
criminality requirement does not apply in many mutual recognition measures. See id. at
art. 2, 2.
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(which is unlawful in England and Wales), from elsewhere in the
European Union, where this is a lawful procedure." An English
court may also have to determine how it should evaluate the
effectiveness of the "judicial supervision" of the suspect's
detention and interrogation provided by a French prosecutor."
Patterns of safeguards between criminal justice personnel across
different phases of the criminal process differ among Member
States. Particular problems arise when information is gathered for
one purpose and used for another. For example, when conducting
terrorist investigations in France, the 'juge d'instruction" shares
information with and generates evidence from the security service
in a way that would be unacceptable in England and Wales.20 This
might pose particular difficulties in determining the provenance of
information and also the weight attached to any resulting evidence.
The European Union has recognized the gap in the Convention
protection, as evidenced by the fact that EU criminal justice has
itself created the need for some degree of uniform procedural
rights that apply regardless of the procedural model of the
jurisdiction.2' Whilst the Convention provides a benchmark,
allowing states to provide protections as they see fit, the EU
regime is more prescriptive and requires a greater degree of
uniformity.2 2 Mutual trust is essential to mutual recognition, and
this is enhanced if countries are confident that they are extraditing
18 Many countries, such as the Netherlands, provide legal advice prior to, but not
during interrogation.
19 See Hodgson, supra note 9, at 1365. Although such practice is currently within
French law, the role of the procureur as a judicial officer is increasingly contested both
within and outside France. See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 9, at 15; see also
Hodgson, supra note 9, at 1378-79.
20 See generally Jacqueline Hodgson, An Independent Report Commissioned by
the Home Office, The Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Suspects in France
(Nov. 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-1321868 (last visited Nov. 29,
2011) (explaining French criminal procedure and comparing its counter-terrorism
processes to those of the United Kingdom).
21 See Resolution of the Council 2009/C 295/01, on a Roadmap for Strengthening
Procedural Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings, Annex,
2009 O.J. (C 295) 1.
22 See id ("Whilst various measures have been taken at European Union level to
guarantee a high level of safety for citizens, there is an equal need to address specific
problems that can arise when a person is suspected or accused in criminal
proceedings.").
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a citizen (including one of their own citizens) to a jurisdiction that
will afford suspects and accused persons the same rights as in the
country extraditing them. Reaching agreement on such measures,
however, has been a real challenge.
Earlier attempts have failed, but the current step-by-step
approach of the EU Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights
takes the accused's rights one at a time,23 maximizing the chances
of agreement.2 4 At the same time, the ECHR has handed down a
set of robust judgments, beginning with Salduz v. Turkey,25
emphasizing the importance of custodial legal advice for all
suspects, across all jurisdictions, regardless of other procedural
protections that may be in place. This has provided an additional
driving force for change at the domestic level (both France2 6 and
Scotland,27 for example, have legislated as a result) and should
make Member States more willing to agree to these measures at
the EU level, given that they closely mirror the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR. Some may argue that EU measures are no longer
necessary given the robust standards laid down by the ECtHR, but
those standards primarily relate to custodial legal advice, and the
Roadmap is a set of measures designed to work together.
Furthermore, it is always preferable to have legislative standards
rather than judicial rulings that might later change.
II. Enforcing Precedent Across Multiple Jurisdictions
The models under the European Union and the Convention are
different than the system of precedent in common law systems,
23 See id. at 3.
24 After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, EU criminal justice now also operates
under a different regime, requiring only qualified majority voting rather than unanimity.
See Steve Peers, EU Lisbon Treaty Analysis No. 4: British and Irish Opt-Outs From EU
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Law, STATEWATCH ANALYSIS (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/nov/statewatch-analysis-lisbon-opt-outs-nov-
2009.pdf.
25 Salduz v. Turkey, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 421, 437-39 (2008).
26 Loi no. 2011-392 du 14 avril 2011 relative A la garde A vue, [Law 2011-392 of
April 14, 2011 relating to Police Custody], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 15, 2011, p. 6610, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023860729&dat
eTexte=&categorieLien=id.
27 Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act,
2010, (A.S.P. 15), § 1, T 4.
[Vol. XXXVII312
EU CRIMINAL JUSTICE
where the binding ruling of the superior court is applied by lower
courts within the same jurisdiction.28 This "traditional" common
law model operates within a closed system in which legal issues
flow vertically up and down, and are part of a common legal
discourse and jurisprudence.2 ' The lower courts frame the legal
question to be determined on an appeal, and once the question is
resolved, the ruling is subsequently applied and absorbed back into
the legal system. The courts are part of the same legal process and
thus work within shared understandings of legal rules and
procedures.
The ECtHR model is different. At one level, it operates within
the closed system of the Convention. The legal issue is
necessarily framed in the Convention terms in order for the
ECtHR to have jurisdiction; the judgment is restricted to this
question and is couched in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. What
makes it different is that this decision must then be translated back
into the terms, concepts, and procedures of the national system.
Broadly, this is a reversal of the process in which the national
issue was originally framed as the Convention issue to be
determined by the ECtHR. For example, in Salduz the failure to
allow the applicant access to legal advice whilst in police custody
was challenged in the ECtHR as a breach of his right to a fair trial
under Article 6 (3)(c) of the Convention, which provides that
every person charged with a criminal offense has the right "to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require."30 The ECtHR ruled that Article 6 had been breached."
This translates back to the national case, in that the trial of Mr.
Salduz on terrorism charges was held to have been unfair because
he was denied legal advice whilst detained and interrogated in
28 See Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice U.S. Supreme Court, Adress at the Tanner
Lectures on Human Values: Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (Mar. 8-9, 1995), available at
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/scalia97.pdf.
29 See generally id. (discussing the concept of stare decisis and pointing out that
news laws are added without overruling former laws in a common law system).
30 Salduz, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 421 45 (2008).
31 Id.
3132011]
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police custody.32 In some instances, the Convention violation is
also a violation of national procedure. In others, the criminal
procedure of the country itself is held to be in breach of the
Convention. Salduz was just such a case, as there was no
provision in Turkish law to allow suspects in security cases to
have access to custodial legal advice."
It is not only the process of translation between domestic
criminal procedure and the Convention that makes this model
different from the "traditional" system of precedent. The second
difference is the application of the decision against Turkey within
the other forty-six legal systems of the members of the Council of
Europe. Although providing a decision within the context of
Turkish criminal procedure, Salduz sets out broad principles
designed to flesh out the meaning of Article 6 in a way that might
be applied across all forty-seven states. As discussed in more
detail elsewhere,34 given the differences in criminal procedure and
due process protections across states, this can be problematic.
This is complicated further by the ECtHR approach that there is a
"'margin of appreciation" whereby all states are not required to
fulfill the Convention obligations in identical ways, taking account
of procedural differences. Unlike the closed domestic system that
operates within a single procedural model, the ECtHR cannot be
so normative or prescriptive in its rulings and states have some
leeway in how they apply this jurisprudence.
As a result, countries may resist compliance with ECtHR
rulings. The reaction to the Salduz case again provides a good
example. A number of countries, including France, the
Netherlands, and Scotland, argued that although they had no
provision for custodial legal advice, the Salduz ruling did not
require them to make any changes because other safeguards were
in place regarding the accused's right to a fair trial; however, when
this argument was challenged in the respective appeal courts, this
reasoning was rejected.3 5 Salduz made it clear that the right to
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Hodgson, supra note 2.
35 Compare the U.K. Supreme Court ruling in Cadder v. HMA, [2010] S.C. 43
(appeal taken from Scot.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-
cases/docs/UKSC_2010_0022 Judgment.pdf (holding that Art. 6 of the Convention
required suspects to have access to a lawyer during police detention and questioning),
314 [Vol. XXXVII
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custodial legal advice is essential in assuring the accused's right to
a fair trial and applies to all procedures.36 Nonetheless, the margin
of appreciation cannot be used as an alibi for non-compliance. As
a result, France and Scotland have been forced to provide a
statutory right to legal advice before and during police
interrogation." Other countries such as the Netherlands are still
grappling with their own legal reforms.
In the context of EU criminal justice, as opposed to court
rulings, we might consider the parallel difficulties in legislating
procedural rights across Member States. The legislative process is
such that measures are debated and agreed to by member state
representatives, but there is still the problem of producing a norm
that can be applied across very different procedural traditions. For
example, initial attempts to make a provision for legal advice in all
EU Member States failed, and many countries argued that this was
inappropriate and unnecessary in procedures centering on the
judicial supervision of criminal investigations as well as on the
detention and interrogation of suspects." This opposition has
with H.M. Advocate v. McLean, [2009] H.C.J. 97, available at
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2009HCJAC97.htmI (ruling, by a unanimous
bench of seven judges, that the absence of a right to custodial legal advice was not
contrary to Art. 6 of the Convention). In France, the Conseil constitutionnel held that the
absence of a provision for access to legal advice through the period of police detention
and questioning was contrary to ECHR jurisprudence and thus unconstitutional. See
HODGSON, supra note 9, at 1398-1411.
36 See Salduz v. Turkey, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 421, 55 (2008) ("That in order for the
right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently 'practical and effective'... Article 6 § 1 requires
that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a
suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular
circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right... The
rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating
statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a
conviction.").
37 See Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland)
Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 15); Loi 2011-392 du 14 avril 2011 relative A la garde A vue, [Law
2011-392 of April 14, 2011 relating to Police Custody], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANcAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 15, 2011, available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.dojsessionid=A19231ACC37222376D21E4D
4FO9EF8F4.tpdjoO4v l?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000023861852&dateTexte=20110918.
38 See Hodgson, supra note 2. This claim was problematic on several levels. First,
it failed to address the universal benefit of legal advice, whatever the procedure; second,
it ignored the fact that in practice, judicial supervision provides almost no guarantee as to
2011] 315
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eased slightly since the Lisbon Treaty, where a majority, rather
than unanimous voting, is required. The U.S. federal system is
perhaps closer to the "traditional" model of precedent, but the
variations across state laws, the political dimension of the
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court's relationship with state
courts create a tension between those at the top and the bottom of
the court hierarchy.
In these examples, the rather broad and diverse nature of the
jurisdiction of the higher legal authority can alienate those
required to implement the decision; put bluntly, those lower down
in the legal food chain may not buy into the values enshrined by
superior courts or legislatures. This can undermine compliance
and enforcement. States may seek to restrict the application of
these legal norms to the original party to which they are addressed,
denying the systemic implications of the decision by deciding to
overturn the conviction in a particular case but declining to change
the legal procedure; other states may distinguish their own
procedures as a way to avoid implementation of the decision. For
example, Salduz affects Turkey, but France and Scotland may say
they have different protections in place, so they are not affected by
the decision. This may be a result of conservatism and a
reluctance to change; it may reflect resentment towards a decision
perceived to be "external" and so "imposed" in some way; or it
may be a question of the practicalities of resources.
In this issue, Donald Dripps describes the unwillingness of
cash-strapped state courts in the United States to impose costly
and time-consuming procedural requirements upon the prosecutor
in order to comply with (the admittedly rare) pro-defence
interpretation of Crawford v. Washington, decided by the Supreme
Court in 2004.39 Like Richard Myers, also in this volume, Dripps
questions the value of affirming rights claims without the
corresponding power to enforce compliance.40 There are
interesting parallels with the implications of the ECHR ruling in
the treatment of the suspect in police custody. Supervision is distant and bureaucratic
and is frequently the responsibility of the prosecutor. See also Hodgson, supra note 7.
39 See Donald A. Dripps, On Reach and Grasp in Criminal Procedure, OR,
Crawford in California, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 349 (2011).
40 See Richard E. Myers, Adversarial Counsel in an Inquisitorial System, 37 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 411 (2011); see also Dripps, supra note 39.
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Salduz, which has already obligated Scotland and France to
implement procedural reform to make provision for custodial legal
advice.4 In both instances, the ECtHR decision was insufficient
to trigger legislative reform. In France, legislation was the result
of the ruling of the Conseil Constitutionnel that French criminal
procedure violated the Constitution in failing to make a proper
provision for legal advice during the suspect's detention and
interrogation in police custody.4 2 In Scotland, the Supreme
Court's decision in Cadder3 has had the same effect. There was
strong resistance to this: Only a year before, in the case of
McClean,' Scotland's highest court rejected the argument that
Scotland was in breach of the ECtHR under Salduz, given that
suspects enjoyed no statutory right to custodial legal advice.
McClean has now been overruled by Cadder.4 5
III. Positive & Negative Rights
The difficulty of implementing ECtHR jurisprudence is a gap
that EU criminal justice measures seek to fill. The EU "Roadmap"
sets out five measures designed to protect the basic rights of
suspects which, if adopted, will set positive standards in terms of
what Member States are required to provide.4 6 Richard Myers
points out in his paper that courts are better at dealing with
negative rights than enforcing positive ones, and he explores this
in relation to the right to counsel in the United States." This, he
argues, might be a cautionary tale for parallel developments in
41 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
42 See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-31,
Sept. 23, 2010, J.O. 17290 (Fr.).
43 See Cadder v H.M.A., [2010] S.C. 43 (appeal taken from Scot.), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2010_0022_Judgment.pdf.
44 See H.M. Advocate v. McLean, [2009] H.C.J. 97, available at
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2009HCJAC97.html.
45 See Cadder, [2010] S.C. 43.
46 The five measures are: (1) Translation and interpretation; (2) information on
rights and information about the charges; (3) legal aid and legal advice; (4)
communication with relatives, employers and consular authorities; and (5) special
safeguards for suspected or accused persons who are vulnerable. Member States also
agreed upon a sixth measure, which was a Green Paper on pre-trial detention. See Press
Release, Luxembourg Council of the European Union, Procedural Rights in Criminal
Procedures (Oct. 23, 2009).
47 See Myers, supra note 40.
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Europe.4 8 In the European context, the ECtHR has tended to find
violations of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the
Convention where the accused has not had adequate defence
representation. This has been developed to include both pre-trial
advice as well as legal counsel at trial. Salduz, however, is
remarkable in that the court has gone further and emphasized the
need for effective custodial legal advice and has set out what
would be required for a clear, voluntary and unequivocal refusal of
this right by the accused.4 9 This goes beyond a general benchmark
standard to be respected within the context of different national
procedural protections and sets out part of a universal, core
defence role."o
The difficulties in enforcing positive rights are also multiplied
when this enforcement must take place across quite different
procedural systems. The ECHR allows a margin of appreciation
to take account of procedural differences and the fact that the same
protection might be provided in different ways." Provided the
accused has received a fair trial overall, no breach will be found.
This means that a breach of the Convention at the pre-trial stage
might be remedied later. The European Union, therefore, is better
placed to set out the basic core defence function in a more
prescriptive way through its legislation and enforce its
implementation through the European Court of Justice. This has
been a difficult task. A major obstacle to such agreement is the
very different legal procedures and cultures that exist across
Member States, making it difficult to identify an inalienable core
defence role that makes sense across jurisdictions. Taru Spronken
and Dorris de Vocht's paper describes the history of attempts to
provide due process protections at the EU level and sets out the
48 See id
49 See supra note 25 and accompanying text
50 Most recently, this has been set out in the clearest terms in Sebalij v. Croatia,
where the ECHR found that the police questioning of a suspect in the absence of a
lawyer (where one had been requested) was a de facto breach of Article 6. See 4429/09
Sebalj v. Croatia, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2011). The Court found two separate breaches of the
Convention: Article 6 §§l and 3(c) were breached when the police questioned the
applicant without a lawyer; Article 6 §1 was breached by admitting the alleged
confession as evidence at trial and by relying on it in convicting the applicant. See id.
51 See Salduz v. Turkey, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 421, % 50-51 (2008).
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detail of the first provisions.52
It is now more important than ever that this is achieved, (1)
given the range of other E.U. criminal justice measures in force
centring on police and prosecution co-operation; and (2) the wider
context of co-operation that hinges on mutual recognition."
Mutual recognition requires states to recognize and enforce the
legal instruments and judgments of other states as if they were
their own. We can immediately see that the uneven provision of
defence safeguards between the states is likely to undermine the
mutual trust necessary for such co-operation, as Martin Bise's
paper demonstrates in relation to trials in absentia.5 4
IV. The Importance of Practice-based Accounts
The final common theme that emerges is the importance of
empirical and contextual accounts of legal process. Christopher
Slobogin's paper discusses how empirical comparisons might be
approached and the potential benefits for policy makers." The
background paper56 for the conference discusses the different
defence roles that exist in French criminal procedure and in
England and Wales and the ways that these models are understood
by other legal actors and are played out in practice."
Occupational cultures, resources and wider process structures can
all contribute to the success or failure of reform." There are
countless examples of measures rendered ineffective in this way.
In England and Wales, solicitors failed to meet the challenge of
providing custodial legal advice and thus left suspects unprotected,
or worse, credited by the courts with a protection which they never
received.5 9 Rather than ensuring proper training for the new role,
52 See Spronken & de Vocht, supra note 3.
53 See id.
54 See Martin Bise, Harmonizing Procedural Rights Indirectly: The Framework
Decision on Trials in Absentia, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 489 (2011).
55 See Christopher Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism and Police Investigation
Practices, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 321 (2011).
56 See Hodgson, supra note 2.
57 See id
58 See id.
59 See Jacqueline Hodgson, Tipping the Scales of Justice: The Suspect's Right to
Legal Advice,1992 CRIM. L. REV. 854, 854-862; see also Mike McConville & Jacqueline
Hodgson, Custodial Legal Advice and the Right to Silence, ROYAL COMM. ON CRIM.
2011] 319
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
police station advice was routinely delegated to untrained,
unqualified and inexperienced staff.6 0 Highly antagonistic to the
encroachment of defence lawyers onto police territory, officers
often fail to inform suspects of their rights and persuade them that
61it is not in their best interest to have a solicitor present. In
France, lawyers were given greater opportunities to influence the
pre-trial investigation in cases before the juge d'instruction, but
both their own occupational culture and that of the juge ensured
that the lawyer continued to play only a subordinate role to that of
the juge in charge of the inquiry. 62 Dorris de Vocht and Taru
Spronken describe the findings of an earlier cross-country study
demonstrating the problems of ensuring that legal advice is both
available and of sufficient quality to be effective when legal aid is
patchy and the rates of pay are poor.63
The ECtHR might be said to have taken a contextual approach
to its assessment of criminal justice protection. It has emphasized
the importance of seeing criminal procedure as a linked process in
which the fairness of the pre-trial will have a significant impact on
the trial.64 It has also made it clear that rights must be practical
and effective and not theoretical and illusory.65 The growing
importance of the European Union in criminal justice poses new
challenges-in particular: how the European Court of Justice and
the ECtHR will interact; how they will ensure consistent
interpretation of fair trial guarantees; and how human rights
protections will be asserted and implemented in different ways.
JUST. (Research Study No. 16, 1993).
60 This is also generally representative of the organization of defence work in many
firms. See MIKE MCCONVILLE, JACQUELINE HODGSON, LEE BRIDGES & ANITA PAVLOVIC,
STANDING ACCUSED: THE ORGANISATION AND PRACTICES OF CRIMINAL DEFENCE
LAWYERS 17-45 (Andrew Ashworth ed., 1994).
61 See id. at 72-100.
62 See Jacqueline Hodgson, Constructing the Pre-Trial Role of the Defence in
French Criminal Procedure: An Adversarial Outsider in an Inquisitorial Process?, 6
INT'L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 1, 1-16 (2002).
63 See Spronken & de Vocht, supra note 3.
64 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
65 See id
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